Since 1977, when Mancuso show that Hanford workers have low rates of cancer mortality, and cohort analyses to show that risk estimates based on atomic bomb data are directly applicable to nuclear workers. [6] [7] [8] [9] According to atomic bomb data the risk of cancer from repeated exposure to small doses of radiation should be too small to show in the Hanford data, and exposures in people over 50 should be less dangerous than earlier exposures.'0 Therefore, when recently confronted with "evidence of an increase in the excess relative risk with increasing age" Gilbert and her associates immediately suspected biased dosimetry."I They did, however, admit that "additional analyses addressing the modifying effects of factors such as age at exposure, time since exposure, calendar period of exposure, age at risk, birth cohort, and calendar year of risk would be desirable".
The Hanford controversy is important as the main alternatives to atomic bomb data are occupational data, and biased dosimetry is important as the International Agency for Research on Cancer (IARC) is currently basing risk estimates for "carcinogenic effects of protracted low-dose exposures to radiation" on pooled data from the United States, Canada, and the United Kingdom.'2 Therefore, included in the present report are data from five nuclear sites, together with the results of pooled and unpooled data in models of relative risk the variables of which included lag period, age at exposure, and year of exposure.
Methods

DATA
From the Hanford Environmental Health Foundation and the Oak Ridge Associated Universities the records of 85 642 badge monitored workers from five nuclear sites (Hanford, and four locations in or near Oak Ridge-that is, X10 (the Oak Ridge National Laboratory), Y12, K25, and Fernald; table 1) were obtained. These data were then divided into three study cohorts (table 2). In the first were all the workers who had ever been at Hanford (cohort H, with 35 868 workers and 1907 cancer cases). In the second were all the remaining workers who had ever been at X10 (cohort X, with 22 239 workers and 430 cancer cases), and in the third were all the residual workers (cohort Y, with 27 535 workers and 639 cancer cases). As well as these cohorts, two further sets of pooled data were obtained by first combining all the non-Hanford data (cohort XY with 49 774 workers and 1069 cancer cases), and then adding the Hanford cohort (cohort HXY with 85 642 workers and 2976 cancers). With step functions as weighting curves for three modulating factors it was possible to have a "window" for each worker, to mark the limits of any "cancer effective doses" defined as any annual doses that had 1 0 as the value for all three step functions ( (Z/flf. The full set of five parameters for this model (ft and e as well as a, y, and () were estimated by the general method for cohort studies (as described by Breslow and Within the model IV windows created by the estimated critical values of ( and a, the doubling doses for H and HXY were 6-5 and 8-2 mSv (fatal cancers) or 5-5 and 103 mSv (all cancers). For these cancer effective doses the age at exposure constraints were 58 and 62 years, and the cancer latency (lag period) constants were 14 and 17 years. For other cohorts with X10 workers (X and XY) the doubling doses were usually much lower (1 1 and 3-6 mSv for fatal cancers, or 2-7 and 13-0 mSv for all cancers) and there were also wider windows. Thus, the age at exposure constraints were 40 or 48 years and the lag period constraints were 19 or 21 years.
The x2S in table 7 were actually "improvements to twice the log-likelihood relative to the null hypothesis of no radiation effect" (appendix). In relation to model IV, for the seven analyses that had significant x2s, the number of cancers with measurable window doses (see the high risk cases in (15-5%) than Hanford (2 3%) despite the fact that the average dose was higher for Hanford than X10 (table 4) . For numbers of radiogenic cancers there were estimates that ranged from 84-9 for HXY to 10-8 for Y, and these too were much higher for X10 (29-2) than for Hanford . The total number of high risk cases to feature in one or more of the seven model IV analyses was 346, with 190 from Hanford, 97 from X10, and 59 from elsewhere (see footnote to table 8). It was eventually discovered that the two larger cohorts formed from pooled data (XY and HXY) were not on exactly the same footing as the other cohorts (see later), so it was not possible to obtain corresponding numbers of radiogenic cancers. There was, however, no mistaking the fact that the cohort with the highest average dose 
of non-linearity of dose response, with an exponent of dose response well below unity. Neither of these findings was confirmed in the 1993 analysis. Therefore, bearing in mind the possibility of much better recording of radiation doses after than before 1960,'5 a systematic search of the whole parameter space was made to discover whether, as well as a global maximum of log likelihood, there was also a local maximum that had more in common with the 1981 than the 1993 analysis.
Before this search was made it was arguable that controlling for levels of internal monitoring on the first occasion, and controlling for socioeconomic status on the second occasion, was sufficient to account for the different findings of the 1981 and 1993 analyses. The search both showed a local maximum, and showed that even with the same controlling factors there would have been significant differences between the 1981 and 1993 analyses (table 13) . Thus, with the local maximum, the critical values were 50 years (for age at exposure) and 1956 (for year of exposure) and with the global maximum the corresponding values were 62 years and 1979. Furthermore, the e values for the exponent of dose response were much lower with the local maximum (0 17 or 0 02) than with the global maximum  (1-31 or 1l14) .
If the correct value of e were as low as 0-2 there would be both a sizable risk of cancer at the lowest dose level and little change with increasing dose. For example, with a window dose of 0 1 mSv, the relative risk would be 1-37 for fatal cancers and 1 87 for all cancers, and a thousand fold increase (to 100 mSv) would only increase the relative risk to 2-05 or 2-22. Therefore, the absurdly low values of E with the local maximum were probably the result of there being a time when failure to record the true doses of process workers at Hanford was producing falsely small differences between the highest and lowest annual doses. In line with this suggestion is the 1991 analysis of Hanford doses"5 that showed that before 1960 there were several years when the average annual dose was barely a tenth of later averages.
Discussion
The results of the present analysis are difficult to reconcile either with the assumption that the cancer experiences of atomic bomb survivors are a reliable source of risk estimates for nuclear workers, or with the assumption that the pooled data of IARC will prove to be a satisfactory alternative to atomic bomb data. The atomic bomb data are unsatisfactory because relations between age at exposure and risk of cancer are manifestly different for survivors and workers, and the pooled data of IARC are unsatisfactory because even within one source of these data (United States) there is evidence of cohort heterogeneity.
A slow unfolding of the mortality experiences of atomic bomb survivors has repeatedly left statisticians with an impression that there were (a) no late effects of the bombing apart from a few extra cancer deaths; (b) no risk of cancer below a certain dose level, and (c) a smaller risk of cancer for people who were over 50 years old when exposed than for younger survivors. Therefore, observers of the Hanford controversy, who included the United States Committee on Biological Effects of Ionising Radiation (BEIR), have repeatedly sided with the rebuttals. If the experiences of atomic bomb survivors were a true guide to the risk of cancers of nuclear workers, however, the effects of including age at exposure among the parameters of a relative risk model would have been very different from the observed effects. Likewise, if there had been uniform standards of dosimetry in all nuclear sites under NRC control, neither the comparisons between pooled and unpooled data in table 12 nor the comparisons between the global and local maxima in the tables, would have shown any significant differences.
Some idea of the extent to which the model IV risk estimates differ from estimates based on atomic bomb survivors can be gleaned by comparing the BEIR V and model IV estimates.'6 According to BEIR V, if 100 000 people with an average life span of 65 years had a continuous lifetime dose of 1 0 mGy/y they would probably experience 990 extra cancer deaths. With no such exposures the expected number of cancer deaths would be 20 100. Therefore, on this basis the average doubling dose would be close to (20 100/990) x 65 or 1320 mGy. For the largest of five cohorts (HXY) model IV had 8-2 mSv as the doubling dose for fatal cancers, 58 years as the critical age at exposure, and 14 years as the critical lag period (table 7, fig 2) . Therefore, by 66 years of age an annual dose of 1 0 mSv would be equivalent to a window dose of 8X2 mSv, and the number of cancer deaths after 80 years would be twice the expected number. Nowadays, both in the United States and in Britain, cancer deaths after 80 years account for 25% of all fatal cancers. Therefore, according to model IV, the average doubling dose would be close to 8-2 x 100/25 or 33 mSv.
These are necessarily rough comparisons, but they are a reminder that it is only after 50 years of age that the model IV estimates are much higher than the BEIR V estimates ( fig  1) . These comparisons are also a reminder that although Kneale et Table 3 shows the nuisance parameters, together with their ranges. Multiplying these ranges together (to obtain the total number of possible risk sets) produced a figure of 4 293 120. This was much too large for computer storage. Only the risk sets with cancer deaths were actually informative ones, and in a table of all possible risk sets the informative sets were so sparse that they could be indexed by the hash technique of Knuth.'9 This reduced the storage requirement to slightly more than twice the number of cancer cases (< 6000).
Large risk sets The number of selections of n, objects taken without replacement from N. objects is of the order of Nns, and can be very large even when N, and n, are moderate. This number determined the number of terms in the denominator sum of products for the contribution to the likelihood (L) of the risk sets (s), and sets containing more than 10 cancer cases and more than 100 cases and matched controls were quite common. Therefore, direct calculation of L by the Breslow and Day formula" was often impossible. Furthermore, direct calculation would have required storage of too many calculated values of relative risk. An alternative was found by realising that as a symmetrical function of relative risk was involved, these risks could be calculated from power sums in much the same way as K statistics can be calculated from moments.20 A suitable formula was derived as follows: Let This left D, as the required denominator.
Also important is the fact that this result only required storage of n, power sums Sq for each risk set, where n, was the maximum number of cases in the risk set. This meant that, together with the efficient storage of risk sets provided by the hash table technique, the total computer storage was not excessive.
Non-differential likelihoods
In the formula for the risk set contribution to L the derivation of the denominator from power sums of relative risks for risk sets made it hard to find the differential coefficients of L with respect to the parameters (a, /1, y, (5, and e) even although L itself is easily calculated.
This meant that variants of the Newton-Raphson algorithm could not be used to find the values of the parameters that maximise L. Instead, L was maximised by varying the parameters directly and a suitable algorithm was the simplex one of Nelder and Mead.2' Method of the resulting computer program A first pass through the data initialised the hash table for storage of the power sums of the informative risk sets. Then -2xln(L) was calculated for each successive approximation to the minimising parameters, by a single pass through the data. For each member of each study cohort the following procedures were used: if he or she were a case then -2xln(R) was added to -2xln(L), where R was the relative risk in the death year. As the same person might be a control in other informative risk sets; each employment year of the hash table was scanned to see which risk sets with potential death years were informative and, where necessary, appropriate additions were made to the power sums. At the end of these passes through the data a sequential pass was made through the hash table (to calculate the denominator of each informative risk set from corresponding power sums) before updating the value of -2xln(L) by any contribution from the denominators. Finally, as a minor improvement, a constant for each risk set (depending on n, and Nj) was added to -2xln(L) so that the contribution to -2xln(L) was zero when all the relative risks in a given risk set were equal to unity. In other words, the final value of -2xln(L) was the approximate X2 referred to in the text.
